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OPTIMAL CLASS SIZE, DUKES, AND THE FUNNY
THING ABOUT SHADY GROVE
William H.J. Hubbard *
INTRODUCTION
Can a class be too big to be certified? This question lurks in the
background of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, given that the class as
certified by the district court was composed of approximately 1.5 mil-
lion members.' Justice Scalia began his opinion in Dukes by noting,
"We are presented with one of the most expansive class actions
ever." 2 With such an enormous class, one is tempted to ask, as Alex-
andra Lahav has, "Are some classes so big that they must fail?"3
A class can certainly be too small to be certified.4 But in some
sense the claim that a class is too large to be certified flies in the face
of the logic of class actions. If the whole point of the class action
device is to provide a procedural vehicle for related claims that are so
numerous that joinder is impractical, then adding more claims to a
class only makes the case for class certification more compelling. As
Lahav and others have pointed out, it is not the numbers themselves
that raise concerns about very large classes, but rather the intuition
that as the size of the class grows the heterogeneity of its members is
also likely to increase.5 With a heterogeneous class, the existence, or
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for comments
and research assistance from Andrew Grindrod, Steve Hagenbuch, Christine Ricardo, and An-
drew Spruiell, and for comments from Charles Silver, Deborah Weiss, and the participants in the
Twenty-Second Annual DePaul Law Review Symposium.
1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
2. Id.
3. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Curse of Bigness and the Optimal Size of Class Actions, 63
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 117, 118 (2010), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/
2010/11/Lahav-The-Curse-of-Bigness-63-Vand.-L.-Rev.-En-Banc-117-20101.pdf.
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
5. Lahav, supra note 3, at 119 ("The relevant inquiry is whether the class is too heterogeneous
to support collective treatment, regardless of the number of plaintiffs the class encompasses.");
Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches? Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of Monolithic
Class Actions, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 71, 72 (2006) ("[T]he sheer size of a putative class is
not prohibitive of a class action. Rather, where a large class seeks to be certified, manageability
is the sine qua non for certification."); Aaron B. Lauchheimer, Note, A Classless Act: The Ninth
Circuit's Erroneous Class Certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 71 BROOK. L. REv. 519, 554
(2005) ("[I]f a class is too large, there are potential issues of manageability and commonality
which could preclude certification."). As my fellow panelist Andrew Trask argued during the
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at least predominance, of common issues will come into question, as
will the manageability of the class action; these concerns about com-
monality, predominance, and superiority determine the propriety of
class treatment, not the size of the class per se. As Charles Silver and
others have noted, to argue otherwise would bias the class certifica-
tion decision in favor of defendants whose wrongdoing is widespread. 6
Nonetheless, the question of "How big is too big?" is useful in that
it prompts one to think in terms of identifying the right size of a class
action. The class action in Dukes has been characterized as "mono-
lithic,"7 and much of the debate about Dukes has focused on individ-
ual litigation as the alternative to a class of 1.5 million members. This
reflects the natural tendency to think of the class certification decision
as a single, up-or-down choice between individual or aggregate litiga-
tion. In some cases, including Dukes, this may also reflect litigation
strategy; plaintiffs may want to present the largest feasible class as the
only option for aggregation, while defendants may not want to con-
cede that any class is certifiable.8
Yet, as we know, the class action device is quite a bit more subtle,
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides numerous mecha-
nisms for adjusting the certified class.9 The class certification decision
can and should involve consideration of the proper scope and size of
the class. Simply because a proposed class might be certifiable under
Rule 23's criteria does not mean that another class definition is not
superior. This Article presents a framework for determining the opti-
mal class size and argues that an examination of Dukes helps opera-
tionalize the challenge of making optimal class size a useful
consideration in class certification decisions.
Symposium, for the Court to label the Dukes class "expansive" implies not only large numbers
of claimants but also breadth and variety in their claims.
6. Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1357, 1367 (2003); see also Pickens, supra note 5, at 89.
7. Pickens, supra note 5, at 90.
8. The plaintiffs in Dukes did not offer any class definition in the alternative to their nation-
wide class of "[a]ll women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since
December 26, 1998 who may have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart's challenged pay and
management track promotions policies and practices." Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 37, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C-01-
02252 MJJ (N.D. Cal. April 28, 2003). Wal-Mart offered no alternative to this class. Cf Defen-
dant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at 42, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. C-01-02252 MJJ (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2003).
9. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)-(5). The extent to which the district court has the power
or discretion to tailor the size of the class suffers from some complications, which I address in
Part IV.
694 [Vol. 62:693
OPTIMAL CLASS SIZE
Part II provides a basic model for examining optimal class size.10
David Betson and Jay Tidmarsh provide a very useful framework for
conceptualizing the problem of determining the optimal class size in a
tractable and illuminating manner. Their key idea is to think of the
class certification decision as choosing the class size, which can be any-
thing from one up to the total number of people conceivably harmed
by the defendants' alleged wrongdoing."
Part III takes some initial steps towards making this model useable
for courts by tying the costs and benefits of increasing class size to
observable qualities of a case. To make the analysis more concrete,
Part III applies the factors identified to the Dukes class.
Part IV connects the idea of optimal class size to the doctrinal ques-
tion of the extent to which Rule 23 gives district courts discretion in
certifying classes. While the rule has long been that the certification
decision is entrusted to the discretion of the district court, language in
a recent Supreme Court case, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v.
Allstate, suggests that a district court lacks discretion to deny class cer-
tification. Moreover, the majority opinion in Dukes appears to disre-
gard the "abuse of discretion" standard of review for class
certification orders. This Article argues that these seemingly conflict-
ing approaches can be rationalized by framing class certification not as
the binary choice to certify or not, but instead as a choice of optimal
class size.
II. VISUALIZING OPTIMAL CLASS SIZE
Consider a court tasked not merely with accepting or rejecting a
motion for certification of a specific class, but also with setting the size
of the class of plaintiffs who will litigate together in a single action. 12
How might the court conduct this analysis? This Article begins with
the unrealistic assumption that the court has enough information to
make judgments about the costs and benefits of adding any given po-
tential class member to the class action. 1 3
10. This Part relates closely to David Betson and Jay Tidmarsh's article, Optimal Class Size,
Opt-Out Rights, and "Indivisible" Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542 (2011).
11. An optimal class size of one would result in the denial of certification and would require
individual litigation. I will treat "the total number of people conceivably harmed by the alleg-
edly wrongdoing of the defendant" as the maximum "possible" class size.
12. It is worth noting that when the question is framed this way, the procedural mechanisms
available include not only class actions, but also consolidated or mass actions if joinder is
practicable.
13. In Part III, I address how we can apply this model under the more realistic assumption of
limited information.
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The first step is to distinguish between the "fixed" and "marginal"
costs and benefits of adding individuals to the class. The term "fixed
costs" refers to only those costs that are essential to undertaking an
activity and do not vary the scale of that activity. For purposes of this
Article, these are costs that relate to the litigation of issues common to
the class. For example, in a class action arising out of a discharge of
pollutant chemicals, one common question may be whether the defen-
dant complied with relevant regulations for the containment of the
chemicals. There is nothing about this question that would be specific
to any individual plaintiff. Regardless of whether the case is litigated
with a single plaintiff or as a class action with 200 class members, this
issue must be litigated. Therefore, this is a fixed cost because the cost
of litigating this issue in a single action does not change with the num-
ber of class members.14 Additionally, fixed benefits may also exist.
For example, a structural injunction against a discriminatory employ-
ment policy that harms a class of individuals may be equally beneficial
regardless of whether it was obtained in an action involving one plain-
tiff or a class of plaintiffs.
The term "marginal costs" refers to those costs that vary with the
scale of the class action. To be more precise, the marginal cost of
adding a class member is the increment in cost caused by the addition
of that class member. The cost of giving notice to that class member is
an example of a marginal cost.' 5
When assessing marginal costs and benefits, it is important to iden-
tify the baseline against which they are calculated. The baseline from
which to judge the costs and benefits of a class action is the alternative
situation in which each potential class member is left to litigate on an
individual basis. In a case with high individual damages, the baseline
will be individual lawsuits. In a case with low individual damages,
such as a consumer class action in which each individual has potential
damages in the hundreds of dollars, no class member would be willing
to litigate on an individual basis. In this latter scenario, the baseline is
no litigation, no costs, and no benefits.
Accordingly, the cost of litigating individual issues would not count
as a marginal cost of expanding the class when those individual issues
would be litigated in individual litigation regardless. When no individ-
ual lawsuits are viable, those costs would not otherwise arise, and
14. It is possible, though, that the amount that the parties invest in litigation of that issue will
depend on the number of plaintiffs in the action. If so, the additional increment in cost is a
marginal cost. See Part III.A for further discussion.
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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therefore the costs of litigating any individual issues would be a margi-
nal cost of adding a class member.
There are also marginal benefits associated with adding an individ-
ual to the class. Marginal benefits can come in two forms: damages
and cost savings. In the case of a class action without which individual
claims would not be brought, adding an individual to the class has a
marginal benefit equal to her expected damages.16 (There are no cost
savings because, in the absence of a class, there are no individual suits
and thus no costs.) In a case in which individual litigation would occur
regardless, damages are not a marginal benefit because they would be
awarded in individual litigation, but the cost savings of avoiding re-
peatedly paying the fixed cost of litigating a common issue in individ-
ual lawsuits is a marginal benefit. Each individual added to the class
thereby reduces the number of times the fixed cost is expended in
individual litigation.17
The next step in the analysis is to assess the marginal costs and ben-
efits of different class members. Not every potential class member
will have the same marginal costs or marginal benefits associated with
adding her to the class. For some individuals, the marginal costs of
adding them to the class may be large because their individual issues
are particularly complex. For others, the marginal benefits may be
large because they have higher damages to claim.
One can therefore array the potential class members in the order
that they would be added to a class. When searching for claimants to
form a class, one would initially choose to add those claimants with
the highest marginal benefits and lowest marginal costs. In more con-
crete terms, these claimants are likely to be individuals whose claims
are strongest and therefore easiest to prove. These claimants will be
subject to fewer individualized defenses, have more concrete evidence
of damages, and so forth.18 On the other end of the spectrum are the
16. In equating marginal benefits with individual damages, I am assuming that the benefits
relevant to the court are the benefits to individual plaintiffs. While this assumption simplifies the
discussion, it is not unassailable. Damages represent a transfer of wealth from the defendant,
and the loss to the defendant is ignored. Of course, this loss is presumably offset by the benefit
to society of deterring defendants' wrongful conduct. It is not obvious that these two effects
exactly cancel, but for simplicity this discussion assumes that they do, and that the relevant bene-
fit is the damages recovered by the plaintiff.
17. Note that there is an asymmetry in how fixed costs and fixed benefits affect the costs and
benefits of aggregating plaintiffs into a class action. Aggregation has the benefit of saving fixed
costs by requiring that they be spent just once, rather than repeatedly in individual actions.
There is no corresponding benefit (or detriment) from aggregation due to fixed benefits. A
structural injunction has no greater or lesser effect in either context.
18. Easy-to-litigate individual issues imply lower marginal costs, but also suggest a stronger
individual case, and therefore potentially higher marginal benefits. This inverse relationship be-
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individuals who would only be added after every other conceivable
class member has already been included. These are the individuals
with high marginal costs and low marginal benefits. In concrete terms,
these are individuals who are likely to have particularly dubious
claims, lack evidence to substantiate their claims, or otherwise appear
as unattractive candidates for class membership.
This gives us the relationship between declining marginal benefit
and rising marginal cost illustrated in Figure 1.19 The optimal class
size is determined by the intersection of the two curves; the optimal
class size in Figure 1 is marked N.2 0 For all individuals to the left of
that point, the marginal benefits of including them in the class exceed
the marginal costs, while for all individuals to the right of that point
the reverse is true.21
tween marginal costs and marginal benefits is illustrated in Figure 1. The interested reader
should note, however, that this inverse relationship is not necessary to the model in this Article.
So long as potential class members are arrayed in order of net marginal benefit (marginal benefit
minus marginal cost), the analysis is the same.
19. Figure 1 reveals an important dimension along which I have chosen to depart from the
model of Betson and Tidmarsh. Betson and Tidmarsh argue that the marginal cost of expanding
the size of the class decreases as class size increases. Betson & Tidmarsh, supra note 10, at 551.
This is contrary to the assumption that economists usually make, which is that marginal cost goes
up as one increases the quantity of something. The justification that Betson and Tidmarsh give
for this departure from standard economic models is that many aspects of the plaintiffs' case are
costly to litigate, for example, the cost of litigating a common legal question, but the costs must
be borne regardless of the size of the class. Id. at 552. As such, the cost of the very first plaintiff
litigating individually is likely to be very high. But such costs are not marginal costs; they are the
"fixed costs" of litigating the action. While these costs are important to account for when mak-
ing the decision whether to litigate, they cannot be assigned to the marginal cost of any individ-
ual plaintiff because they are not costs associated with the addition of that plaintiff's claim. See
infra note 21. Once fixed costs are separated from marginal costs, we should expect that the
marginal cost associated with adding additional plaintiffs should rise (or at least not fall) as the
size of the class increases. For further support for this point, see supra note 18 and infra Part
III.B. It should also become clear that Betson and Tidmarsh's concern about multiple equilibri-
ums dissipates. Betson & Tidmarsh, supra note 10, at 560-66.
20. For ease of exposition, I have discussed the case in which claimants with high marginal
costs have low marginal benefits, and vice versa. More generally, though, net marginal benefits
(i.e., marginal benefits minus marginal costs) determine optimal class size. As Figure 1 illus-
trates, class size is optimal when net marginal benefit of adding another class member is zero.
21. The reader may wonder where the fixed costs of the class action factor into the certifica-
tion decision. Fixed costs are relevant to the determination of optimal class size in the following
way: if, at the class size given by the intersection of the marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves, the total of all of the individual marginal costs plus the fixed cost of litigating the class
action exceed the total of all of the individual marginal benefits, then the optimal class is zero.
In other words, if the total costs of litigation outweigh the total benefits, even at best possible
class size, then no litigation should occur at all.
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FIGURE 1: MARGINAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ADDING A CLASS
MEMBER, AS A FUNCTION OF CLASS SIZE
$
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N Class Size
III. MAKING THE MODEL PRACTICAL
To say that marginal benefit falls and marginal cost rises as the class
grows, and that therefore there will be a class size for which the two
are equal and that this represents the optimal class size, is only the
starting point for our analysis. Without more, one has no way of
knowing where this optimal point lies. Indeed, as Betson and
Tidmarsh pointed out, the optimal class size in any particular case may
be small, large, or even the maximum possible class size.22
To make this conceptual framework operational, one must under-
stand when marginal benefits and marginal costs are smaller or
greater in a specific case. The problem is that assigning precise nu-
merical values to the marginal cost and marginal benefit of adding any
particular claimant is infeasible. It is, however, realistic to discuss the
different qualities that a case might have that could impact the margi-
nal benefits and marginal costs of expanding the class. For example,
optimal class size will tend to be smaller for a group of potential class
members for which one expects the marginal benefits of increasing
class size to be low or falling rapidly, or for which one expects the
22. See Betson & Tidmarsh, supra note 10, at 555-63.
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marginal costs to be high or rapidly rising. The following Part dis-
cusses some factors that could be considered in making judgments
about the relative marginal costs and benefits of increasing class size
in a given case.
A. Marginal Benefit Factors
This Part focuses on three benefits of including a potential class
member in the class. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but
rather a set of factors that may often be relevant to the question of the
scope or scale of a class definition.
1. Economies of Scale
A fundamental rationale for class actions is that they take advan-
tage of economies of scale in the litigation of related claims. If each
potential class member has to litigate on an individual basis, the costs
of litigating a common issue may be duplicated in every individual
case.23 Adding an individual to the class creates the marginal benefit
of avoiding this duplicated expense.24 All else equal, increasing class
size and decreasing the number of individual actions improves the
economies of scale.
Related to the cost savings from economies of scale are arguable
improvements in the quality of adjudication, given that plaintiffs-or
more accurately the attorneys representing plaintiff classes-will have
incentives to invest into investigating the facts and law relevant to the
common issues presented in the litigation. Consequently, one can ex-
pect the results of the adjudication to be better informed.
Further, as David Rosenberg has argued, if in the absence of a class
action the defendant can gain some economies of scale in preparing its
defense to multiple litigations, but plaintiffs (perhaps because of high
coordination costs) cannot, then the defendant will have an inherent
advantage in the litigation of common issues in each individual law-
23. Note that there are alternative means, other than class certification, to control the costs of
redundancy associated with individual actions that share common issues. If multiple plaintiffs
are represented by the same counsel, the costs of factual investigation and legal research can be
consolidated. Joinder, transfer, and multi-district litigation can reduce many of the costs of re-
dundancy as well. See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and
Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 393, 397-99 (2000). The model of optimal class size can
be understood as a model of optimal aggregation, in which smaller "class" sizes are accom-
plished through mechanisms other than class certification. See supra note 12.
24. This is true at least in circumstances in which individual suits would be brought. For situa-
tions in which individual suits are not feasible, see infra Part III.A.2.
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SUit.25 Adding plaintiffs to a class reduces this advantage, up to the
point that the entire potential class is litigating as a single unit.26
2. Solving the "NEV Problem" for High-Merit, Low-Stakes Cases
In some cases, adding a person to a class creates an opportunity for
redress of a meritorious claim that could not, as a practical matter, be
brought on an individual basis. This is the case in the context of the
so-called "negative expected value" or "NEV" lawsuit-an individual
lawsuit for which the plaintiff's cost of litigating the claim is greater
than her expected recovery.27 For an individual who has a claim that
(by assumption) is meritorious, but the amount of damages she can
recover is relatively small (e.g., hundreds or a few thousand dollars), it
is not economically sensible to file suit individually. Consequently,
the expected recovery from her claim is a marginal benefit of adding
her to the class because the alternative is no redress at all.2 8 Con-
versely, an individual whose meritorious claim is likely to garner a
large award (e.g., millions of dollars) has a viable afternative to class
litigation; her expected recovery is not a marginal benefit of adding
her to the class.
Thus, economies of scale are most important when cases will be liti-
gated individually and will involve high fixed costs. Conversely, the
NEV problem arises when meritorious cases will not be individually
litigated.
3. Consistency and Deterrence
As the size of the class grows, the likelihood that one has included
all of the potential class members who were injured by the alleged
wrongdoing of the defendant increases, which has at least two bene-
fits. First, one might argue that it is important to treat similarly situ-
ated parties consistently. This desire for consistency may be grounded
in inchoate intuitions about fairness or in a more explicit set of beliefs
25. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 393-95.
26. Id. at 397-98. Strictly speaking, equality in investment should be achieved once one adds
all of the potential plaintiffs who would have litigated individually. Rosenberg focused on mass
torts and did not consider classes involving claims that would not be brought on an individual
basis. See id. at 395.
27. "Expected recovery" refers to the damages sought, discounted by the probability of
prevailing.
28. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions, 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 73, 74-75 (2011) ("[L]arge entities have incentives to engage in wide-
spread but small violations of law because their lawyers know that most people cannot afford to
sue over a small transgression."). Some scholars argue that this concern is especially serious in
the context of employment discrimination claims. See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimi-
nation Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 841-42 (2004).
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about how the civil justice system should operate. By making all of
the parties injured by the defendant subject to the same judgment, the
class action may further this end. Second, adequate deterrence of
wrongdoing requires that the defendant be answerable for the full
amount of harm that it has caused. The class action that fails to in-
clude all of the victims of the wrongdoing may be insufficient to deter
future wrongdoing, especially if those individuals excluded from the
class will not file individual suits.
B. Marginal Cost Factors
One must also consider costs when evaluating optimal class size.
Each of the costs of including a potential class member in the class is,
in some sense, a mirror image of the corresponding benefit listed
above.
1. Diseconomies of Scale: Administrative and Agency Costs
Some aspects of class litigation are more expensive than individual
litigation. For example, many class actions require notice to class
members. 29 The cost of notice is a marginal cost of increasing the size
of the class. This marginal cost is likely to rise as the class grows; the
plaintiffs must give notice to ever more remote and harder-to-identify
class members.
The "agency costs" associated with the attorney-client relationship
also rise with class size. The larger the class, the less incentive any
individual class member has to expend effort monitoring class counsel.
This is the familiar free-rider problem, and it gives the class counsel
the ability to represent the class in ways that may serve the counsel's
interests at the expense of the class. Concern about this agency prob-
lem has motivated a number of unique procedural features in class
action litigation, such as court-appointed class counsel and court ap-
proval of class settlements. 30 These measures mitigate the potential
agency costs of larger classes, but these mechanisms are themselves
costly.
2. Creating an "NEV Problem" for Low-Merit, High-Stakes Cases
The NEV problem applies not only to cases with high merit and low
stakes, but also to cases with low merit and high stakes.31 The differ-
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (g).
31. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1295-96 (2002) (discussing how low-merit cases that are not viable on an indi-
vidual basis may have settlement value when aggregated); see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra
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ence is that, as a normative matter, it is probably a good thing that the
NEV problem discourages the filing of low-merit cases. Thus, adding
a person with a low-merit, high-stakes claim to a class action may
make a claim viable that ought not to be. Further, to increase class
size, one has to include individuals with progressively weaker claims,
and thus the marginal cost of the NEV problem is likely to rise with
class size.
3. Inconsistency and Underdeterrence
As the size of the class grows, the likelihood that one has included
individuals who do not properly belong to the class increases. Thus,
the harms caused by potential overinclusion are essentially the mirror
image of the benefits of including the individuals who properly belong
to the class. First, dissimilar individuals are treated similarly. Second,
by forcing defendants to risk liability to individuals that they did not
harm, larger classes undermine the effectiveness of deterrence, which
depends on potential wrongdoers perceiving greater liability if they
break the law than if they comply with it.32
C. Applying the Model to Wal-Mart v. Dukes
To illustrate the application of these factors, I turn my attention to
the subject of this Symposium: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and its class of 1.5
million members.
1. Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
There is no doubt that a class of 1.5 million members increases the
potential for economies of scale. However, the nature of the substan-
tive claims in Dukes was such that many aspects of the litigation
would not have the benefit of economies of scale. For example, as the
Dukes Court pointed out, questions of statutory defenses necessarily
have to be addressed on an individual basis. 33 Further, with such a
large class, agency costs are also likely to be significant. The fact that
many relevant issues are individualized exacerbates agency costs be-
cause attorneys tasked with representing the class as a whole will be
placed in the difficult position of managing intraclass conflicts with
respect to issues like statutory defenses, injunctive relief, and dam-
note 28, at 76 ("Just as the bigness of the aggregated profits from illegalities in millions of small
transactions tempts some companies, so too does the bigness of class action damages tempt some
lawyers.").
32. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 2-3 (1994).
33. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
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ages. Further, as noted below, few of the potential class members
have claims that would be economically feasible to bring on an indi-
vidual basis. In this case, while a class action could solve a NEV prob-
lem, it would not save the costs of litigating common issues in
individual litigation. Consequently, this factor points away from a
large class size being optimal.
2. The NEV Problem(s)
This factor is more ambiguous. Dukes may present a NEV problem
due to low stakes, which cuts in favor of larger class size. If the al-
leged pay differentials between what the plaintiffs were paid and what
they would have been paid are small, damages may be low enough
that the class device is the only meaningful mechanism for relief.
While the demand for backpay suggests that individual damages could
be large, the plaintiffs alleged that this was not the case. In their brief
to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued, "Significantly, individual
class claims for back pay in this case are likely to be relatively small,
amounting to an average of $1,100 per year for hourly workers. Pros-
ecution of such claims individually would be largely impracticable
1,34
Notably, though, the plaintiffs requested punitive damages. Per-
haps the prospect of collecting such damages would be sufficient to
induce individual suits. Assuming that these are high-merit cases, it is
possible, though perhaps unlikely, that individual suits would be via-
ble for at least some class members.
Complicating the analysis is the fact that this case may also have
presented a NEV problem due to low merit. The plaintiffs' legal the-
ory was muddled, 35 and it was not clear how the allegations of a com-
pany-wide policy of decentralized decision making would, if proven,
have done anything to further any individual plaintiff's claim to dam-
ages. 3 6 As such, while the low stakes may counsel in favor of ensuring
34. Brief for Respondents at 60, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No.
10-277) (citation omitted).
35. As Deborah Weiss noted:
First, the idea of a "conduit of infection" was a metaphor, not a legal theory. Plaintiffs
nominally advanced both a disparate impact and a disparate treatment claim but made
no serious effort to situate their conduit theory within these traditional legal categories.
Second, to the extent that a specific claim could be discerned, it was inconsistent with
widespread notions of what is fair in structural cases.
Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119,
123 (2012).
36. Matt Rozen argues that Dukes should stand for the rule that a class complaint cannot
create a "common question" out of a disputed issue that would not be required to be proven in
the context of an individual action. In Dukes, even if a company-wide policy of delegated discre-
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that a class is large enough to be economically viable, the Dukes plain-
tiffs' peculiar theory of liability suggests that the optimal class size
may not be much larger than that. A class of hundreds or thousands
could make the action economically viable. However, a class of 1.5
million members would risk exacerbating, rather than ameliorating, a
NEV problem.
3. Consistency Across Cases
The fact that a central pillar of the Dukes plaintiffs' legal theory was
that Wal-Mart had a policy of decentralized decision making reduces
concerns about consistency across individuals. Any concerns that we
may have about like people being treated alike are not triggered by a
claim that presupposes that class members with different supervisors
would have been treated differently.
So, too, does the allegation of decentralized decision making
weaken concerns that smaller class size will weaken deterrence. The
argument that maximum class size is necessary for optimal investment
in developing the plaintiffs' case rests on the assumption of a well-
defined class of people who were in fact injured if the plaintiffs' theory
of the case is true.37 This is simply not the case in Dukes; there is little
doubt that some share of the 1.5 million class members were not, in
fact, discriminated against, even if there is little doubt that a certain
share was.
Putting these three sets of factors together suggests a few conclu-
sions.38 A class of maximum size is not optimal; however, a smaller
class size may be. The class size should be large enough so that indi-
vidual claims-averaging perhaps $1,100 per class member, plus puni-
tive damages-become viable when aggregated. Further, the class
should be structured so as to avoid the agency problems associated
tion were proven, each class member would still need to prove that her supervisor discriminated
against her, yet this is exactly what she would have to prove in an individual lawsuit, even in the
absence the alleged company-wide policy. The allegations of this company-wide policy cannot
suffice as a common question because it is not a question whose answer matters to the resolution
of class members' claims. Matthew Rozen, The Well-Pleaded Class Complaint: The Secret Life
of Pleading Rules in Wal-Mart v. Dukes 23-24 (May 14, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
37. As noted above, this argument as developed by David Rosenberg does not address class
actions in which individual actions have negative expected value. See Rosenberg, supra note 23,
at 393-95. Class members who have no entitlement to relief even if the plaintiffs' theory is true
certainly qualify as claimants whose individual actions would have negative expected value.
38. Keep in mind that this discussion does not address the factors, like commonality, that Rule
23 by its terms requires before a class of any size is certified. The factors related to certification
vel non generally also relate to optimal class size, though. For example, agency costs associated
with larger classes are highly relevant to the adequacy and typicality prongs of the Rule 23(a)
analysis.
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with including plaintiffs who are subject to distinct supervisory chains
of command, or with interest in different types of relief. Taken to-
gether, classes based on stores or groups of stores, and limited only to
former or only to current employees, may be optimal. Because the
class certified by the district court in Dukes clearly failed to account
for these issues, the class exceeded its optimal size.
IV. SHADY GROVE AND DUKES
This Part turns from practical considerations to doctrinal ones.
Framing the class certification decision in terms of optimal class size is
helpful in resolving a seemingly unrelated wrinkle in appellate proce-
dure that makes an appearance in Dukes.
There are two aspects of the Court's appellate review in Dukes that
may appear puzzling. First is the majority opinion's inattention to the
standard of review. It is widely recognized that the class certification
decision is committed to the discretion of the district court 39 and is
reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. 40 The dissent in Dukes
recognized this standard of review,41 but the majority opinion ignored
it. Thus, Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky have chided the
Dukes Court for "[i]gnoring the abuse of discretion standard of review
normally applicable to class certification decisions" in rejecting the
district court's class certification findings and judgment.42 Instead,
Fisk and Chemerinsky argue that "Justice Scalia substituted his own
findings of fact, granted no deference to the lower courts, and effec-
tively engaged in a de novo review." 43
Second is the majority's decision to address commonality under
Rule 23(a)(2). That decision is peculiar given the Court's unanimous
agreement that, under Rule 23(b)(2), certification is improper "where
(as here) the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or de-
claratory relief." 44
39. See, e.g., In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 2004); Armstrong v.
Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871 n.28 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting the norm that the district court has "broad
discretion" to certify class); Hartman v. Duffy, 19 F.3d 1459, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also
Pickens, supra note 5, at 80.
40. See, e.g., Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2004).
41. "Absent an error of law or an abuse of discretion, an appellate tribunal has no warrant to
upset the District Court's finding of commonality." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541, 2547, 2562 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 82.
43. Id. at 84.
44. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
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The Court's opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.
Allstate Insurance Co.4 5 helps explain these puzzling aspects of Dukes.
Although Shady Grove is best known as the Supreme Court's latest
word on the so-called "Erie Doctrine," it also serves as a signpost in
the Supreme Court's class action jurisprudence. In fact, the irony of
Shady Grove is that its discussion of the Erie Doctrine fails to com-
mand a majority of the Court, and thus is not binding precedent.46
The only legal analysis with precedential value in Shady Grove is the
discussion of class action rules.
Writing for the court, Justice Scalia discussed the specific language
of Rule 23:
Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly empow-
ers a federal court "to certify a class in each and every case" where
the Rule's criteria are met. But that is exactly what Rule 23 does: It
says that if the prescribed preconditions are satisfied "[a] class ac-
tion may be maintained"-not "a class action may be permitted."
Courts do not maintain actions; litigants do. The discretion sug-
gested by Rule 23's "may" is discretion residing in the plaintiff: He
may bring his claim in a class action if he wishes. And like the rest
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 automatically ap-
plies "in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States dis-
trict courts." 47
Presumably, the Court's motivation in writing this passage was to
quickly dispose of an argument it found weak.48 But the Court's lan-
guage does more than this. To say that the phrase "a class action may
be maintained" gives discretion to the plaintiff but not to the district
court seems to interpret the language of Rule 23 to make certification
mandatory, so long as the listed factors are satisfied. This seems to be
in tension with the notion that the class certification decision is com-
mitted to the discretion of the district court.
This tension is relieved by the fact that at least some of the require-
ments for class certification-numerosity, adequacy, superiority, and
so on-seem to require not only the application of law to fact, but an
exercise of judgment on the part of the court about whether those
factors are met in a given case. Thus, for example, a ruling that join-
der is practicable in a case with a small putative class requires not only
conclusions of law (subject to de novo review) and findings of fact
(subject to clear error review), but an exercise of discretionary judg-
45. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
46. Only Parts I and It-A of Justice Scalia's opinion speak for the Court, but its discussion of
the Erie Doctrine begins in Part 1l-B. See id. at 1434, 1442.
47. Id. at 1438 (citations omitted).
48. Allstate argued that Rule 23 addressed only whether a claim is in fact "certifiable" rather
than whether it is "eligible" for certification. See id.
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ment about practicability (subject to abuse of discretion review).
Nonetheless, discretion to say the requirements for class certification
are not met and discretion to deny class certification if the require-
ments are met are functionally identical. And the passage from Shady
Grove quoted above states that it is the litigant, not the court, who has
discretion under Rule 23.
If the Dukes majority was, in fact, reluctant to give district courts
discretion to deny class certification, this helps explain why the major-
ity was eager to address Rule 23(a)(2), despite the Court's unanimous
ruling on the Rule 23(b)(2) issues. If a district court has no discretion
to refuse to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, so long as the prereq-
uisites in the text of Rule 23(a) are met, then any court (including the
Supreme Court) would feel pressure to define the Rule's prerequisites
more strictly, or at least in a manner that requires courts to make
pragmatic judgments about the feasibility and desirability of a class
action-judgments that are explicitly demanded only by the predomi-
nance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Viewed in this light, it is no surprise that the Dukes majority drew
criticism from the dissent for doing exactly this. In dissent, Justice
Ginsburg noted, "The Court's emphasis on differences between class
members mimics the Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry into whether common
questions 'predominate' over individual issues. And by asking
whether the individual differences 'impede' common adjudication, the
Court duplicates 23(b)(3)'s question whether 'a class action is supe-
rior' to other modes of adjudication." 49
Nonetheless, the puzzle remains; the majority's discomfort with in-
vesting district courts with discretion to certify classes runs up against
decades of class action practice, as well as the practice since Shady
Grove and Dukes.50 Most jarringly, it contradicts the case that the
Shady Grove majority cited in the passage quoted above, Califano v.
Yamasaki.51 In that case, the Court reviewed a dispute over the certi-
fication of a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(2) and concluded:
"The certification of a nationwide class, like most issues arising under
Rule'23, is committed in the first instance to the discretion of the dis-
49. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
50. See, e.g., Prof'l Firefighters Assn. of Omaha, Local 385 v. Zalewski, 678 F.3d 640, 645 (8th
Cir. 2012) ("The district court is accorded broad discretion to decide whether certification is
appropriate, and we will reverse only for abuse of that discretion."); In re Whirlpool Corp.
Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 678 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2012) ("The district court
has broad discretion to decide whether to certify a class. . . . We review class certification for an
abuse of discretion." (citation omitted)).
51. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 684 (1979).
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trict court. On the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that the Dis-
trict Court . . . abused that discretion .".. ."52
One way to reconcile the seemingly absolutist attitude toward Rule
23 in Shady Grove and Dukes with the continuing (and otherwise un-
controversial) practice of abuse of discretion review is to view class
certification as involving not only the decision to certify or not to cer-
tify a class, but also the decision to determine what class size is most
appropriate. One can be faithful to the text of Rule 23 as interpreted
by Shady Grove by accepting the proposition that the district court
has no discretion not to certify a class if the requirements of Rule 23
are met, while still recognizing that a district court has discretion in
setting the proper size of the class that gets certified. In this respect, it
may be worth noting that while Rule 23's language that a "class action
may be maintained" may imply that discretion rests in the plaintiff to
bring, or not to bring, an action on a class basis,53 the Rule does not
imply that the plaintiff has discretion to define the size or scope of the
class. 54 This gloss on Rule 23 also has the benefit of confirming mean-
ingful appellate review of the judgment that the elements of Rule 23
have been satisfied, while allowing district court judges to retain some
discretion to make pragmatic decisions about the allocation of judicial
and societal resources between individual and aggregate litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
In some sense, the class in Dukes was "too big." Studying what
made that class too sprawling to be certified lends some insight into
the question of how to better tailor the size of classes to the justifica-
tions for class treatment. And by framing the class certification deci-
sion in terms of optimal class size, one can gain some insight into
other aspects of Dukes and its not-so-distant cousin, Shady Grove v.
Allstate.
52. Id. at 703.
53. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.
54. The Rule appears to favor the district court over the plaintiff on this point. Rule
23(c)(1)(B) states, "An order that certifies a class action must define the class and the class
claims," which may vest the district court, not the plaintiff, with the discretion to set the scope of
the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). More helpfully, Rule 23(c)(4) ("Particular Issues") and
Rule 23(c)(5) ("Subclasses") both begin with "When appropriate," which suggests an appeal to
sound judgment of the district court, rather than solely to the discretion of the plaintiff, in cabin-
ing the scope of a class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)-(5).
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